Eurocentrism, Euromodernity
Author:
Maria Kardash
The idea of progress as a European “invention” is also connected with the concept of Euromodernity, which represents the belief that Europe and the Western world are positioned ahead of other cultures on the imaginary scale of “traditional past–progressive future”. According to this belief, in order to approach modernity, the other regions of the world should “catch up” with the West, going through similar developmental stages, which does not take into account the direct influence of colonial policy on accelerated transformations in European countries. Even studies that examine the existence of different variants of modernity based on regional characteristics emphasize that Euromodernity is perceived as the most representative form of modernity and a common point of reference.
De/post-colonial theory criticizes the Eurocentric worldview for promoting distribution of the world’s resources in favor of the West and underestimating the importance of non-European cultures in global history. This opinion is particularly widespread in regions significantly affected by the European colonial project — Latin America, Africa, much of Asia. In the Ukrainian context, Eurocentrism is usually aligned with European integration: establishing strategic partnerships and strengthening connections with the European Union. Popular Ukrainian discourses are penetrated by the idea of a “European vector of development” as the only possible alternative to Moscow’s hegemony and “Ukraine’s return home” due to its geographical and historical ties [2]. It is interesting to note that such rhetoric is based, among other things, on Ukraine’s past as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, from the perspective of the oppositional “Europe-Russia” dichotomy, is often presented as the “lesser evil” when compared with the Russian Empire [3]. The events of the past ten years (Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, the Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas, and the full-scale invasion in 2022) confirm the polarity of the choice between Russia and Europe, firmly securing the plus sign to the latter in the public consciousness. Europe stands as the antipode of Russian terror and aggression, and serves as an embodiment of high moral qualities, personal freedoms, and democracy.
Due to this binary choice, Ukrainian society rarely questions the image of the West as a driver of history and progress. On the contrary, the idea of protecting “European values” finds its symbolic reflection in the “outpost of Europe” narrative, which, despite its racist tone, became especially popular in Ukraine after February 24th, 2022. In the framework of this idea, Ukraine is the last bastion of Western civilization, which defends not only its sovereignty and right to exist, but also the whole of Europe and its civilizational achievements (progress, enlightenment, democracy) from the invasion of the “Horde”, understood as a chaotic force that comes from the East and represents everything barbaric, despotic and backward, i.e. “Asian”. Another common narrative in Ukrainian society about the non-European origins of the Russian people operates with similar ideas: they are not in fact Slavs, but Finno-Ugric people who were impacted by Tatar-Mongol influence, and this, on a genetic level, predetermines their aggressive nature [4].
The Ukrainian vision of itself as an outpost of Europe is not unique: the idea of separation from barbarian neighbors has been circulating on the territories of the Eastern European border for several centuries, and the location of the “civilisation gap” changes depending on geopolitical factors (the split of the Christian Church into Catholic and Orthodox divisions, or the threat of an attack by the Ottoman Empire). Ironically, in the early versions of the concept of “the outpost of Western civilization”, Ukrainians find themselves behind its defensive walls: the honorable mission of defending Europe from the “Horde” falls to Poland or Hungary, while Ukrainians belong to the “savage” East, either as part of the Russian Empire or the USSR. The tendency to perceive neighbors from the eastern border as less progressive still remains strong in European countries (for example, German stereotypes about Poles, Polish stereotypes about Ukrainians), as if moving eastward along an imaginary map is marked by the gradual disappearance of “civilization” and “Europeanness”. According to this logic, peripheral Eastern Europe is almost devoid of “Europeanness”, and is already the territory of the Other.
This inner hierarchy is usually invisible to an observer outside of Europe, for whom its Eastern part is characterized by the same privilege as its Western part, including white skin color and access to welfare. The ambiguous image of Eastern Europe (the “rich West” on the global level, the “backward periphery” within the region) places its inhabitants in a position of ambivalence and alienation both in relation to the Global South and the rest of Europe. This, in turn, explains the desire of Ukrainians to isolate themselves not only from the actual enemy, but also from the non-Western world, in order to finally complete a mental map that declares Ukraine an “outpost of civilization” — turning peripherality into a privilege, rejecting the role of the Other in Europe, and once and for all establishing its position as a part of the European center.
The simplified interpretation of the war with Russia as an eternal confrontation between European civilization and Asian barbarians exposes the existence in Ukrainian society of problematic “companions” to Eurocentrism that are mentioned in de/post-colonial theory: the perception of the world outside Europe as backward, beliefs of superiority towards non-European cultures, which transforms into supremacism and racism. It is important to emphasize that this attitude is often reinforced by the ambiguous position of the countries of the Global South regarding the war with Russia. Paradoxically, some intellectuals from the Global South openly support Russia as a leader in the fight against Western neocolonialism and do not recognize Russian colonialism as such purely because of its non-Western [5] nature. On the other hand, the lack of criticism of Eurocentrism in Ukrainian discourses complicates the dialogue with countries outside the West and their perception of Ukraine as a state that has also suffered (and is still suffering) from foreign imperial ambitions — that is, as a partner and ally in decolonization processes.
Endnotes
02. Examples of using the image of Europe as Home: “Returning home. How Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are approaching EU membership”, 2023, or I.Farion, “The EU summit showed that Ukraine’s place is in the European home”, 2023.
03. In this case, the quote from Yaroslav Hrytsak’s lecture “Happy Grandmother Austria” (2017) is indicative: “For us, this Austrian myth is a symbol of the fact that we have already been there in the West, and therefore have the right to return”.
04. Similar ideas are found even in the academic environment, see the publication Hordiichuk, O. (2023). The Ideological and Ontological Causes of Russia's War on Ukraine. West versus East; Tyranny versus Democracy or Lyzanchuk, V (2022) Once again about why Russians are not Slavs, but the main criminals in the world history.
05. In particular, the Argentinian researcher Walter Mignolo in his essay It Is A Change Of Era, No Longer An Era Of Changes (2023).
For further reference
Bhambra, G. K. (2015). Modernity: History of the Concept. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences: Second Edition, 692–696.
Dussel, E. (1995) Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures). In: Beverley, J., Oviedo, J. & Aronn, M. eds. The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America. Durham, US: Duke University Press: 65-77.
Eurocentrism Overview on ScienceDirect.
Kalmar, I (2023) Race, racialisation, and the East of the European Union: an introduction, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 49:6, 1465-1480, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2022.2154909
Quijano, A. (2007): Coloniality And Modernity/ Rationality, Cultural Studies, 21:2-3, 168-178.
Author
Maria Kardash
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