Epistemic Injustice
Author:
Daria Popil
Translation from Ukrainian: Galyna Kotliuk
Editor: Clemens Poole
Miranda Fricker's conceptual framework identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical.
Testimonial injustice occurs when the reliability of the speaker is unfairly devalued over the bias that leads to a dismissive perception of the information they provide. This form of injustice is identified by the allocation of excessive credibility to certain speakers and a lack of trust to the marginalised groups — similar to the situation in the male-dominated professions, where female voices are perceived with less trust; or, for instance, as in the testimony of black people, who are less trusted than the representatives of the white dominant group.
As for hermeneutical injustice, it occurs due to a lack within collective interpretative resources, a gap hindering the understanding of a person's social experience. This type of injustice is particularly relevant for those belonging to marginalized groups who struggle for the articulation of their experience due to a lack of recognition in a dominant interpretative framework. As an example, Fricker mentions the activities of the #MeToo movement, which resulted in the situation where violent acts that had previously qualified as flirting began to be called harassment. This example shows how a hermeneutically marginalized group (women), i.e. a group that lacked appropriate concepts to describe their traumatic experience, is fighting for the right to define said experience.
As a researcher of the philosophical foundations of morality, Fricker questions the set understanding of the norm, where justice as such is the basic attitude, and any injustice is a deviation. According to Fricker, in some spheres of human activity, particularly in the context of epistemic activity, injustice is the norm. What is more, only an understanding of epistemic injustice can help overcome it and move towards justice.
For a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of epistemic injustice, let us consider an example of the suppression of Ukrainian identity in the academic humanities during the later years of the USSR. During this period, characterized by the replacement of direct violence with subtler forms of suppression of national identity, Ukrainians in academia faced prejudices concerning the articulation of their unique experience, being unable to separate their identity from the Soviet one [2]. In the context of Ukrainian philosophical research in the 1970s and 1980s in particular, there are noticeable manifestations of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. We have a reason to consider systematic discrediting of Ukrainian humanities scholars through basic ideological prejudices to be a testimonial injustice. The strict control of the Soviet regime over all academic discussions led to a state where only those supporting the ideology were considered to be deserving of trust. The semantic field of the notion of credibility (according to Fricker) was covered by the concept of trustworthiness which was used in official discourse. In his memoirs, Anatoly Loy recalls that “access to the restricted archives depended solely on political trustworthiness, rather than being dependent on the theme of the research” [3. 4]. According to Loy, only an “unblemished” reputation (essentially, ideological mimicry, rejection of one's national identity) was a prerequisite for the very possibility to conduct research. Natalia Viatkina's memoir similarly mentions that “a person who wasn't in the party in those times could not become as much as an assistant [in a university department], much less a university lecturer: the ideological department of the party committee would not approve such candidates” [5, 6]. Thus, under the yoke of the Soviet regime, Ukrainian humanities found themselves in the situation of a credibility deficit. Such consistent policies resulted in a total depreciation of knowledge and experience based on political bias, which is a clear sign of injustice, when trust in the speaker is undermined by prejudice.
The hermeneutical injustice of the Soviet era led to the suppression of Ukrainian cultural and intellectual identity. Ideological control limited the research and the scope of Ukrainian historical, cultural, and philosophical perspectives. As Svitlana Ivashchenko notes, it was expected that the research would reflect “the zeitgeist”, which was significantly affected by the Soviet ideology [7]. The editor adds that “philosophers worked if not in the paradigm, then at least in an environment where it was considered that someone was the carrier of the truth, whereas others might either understand something "right" or "wrong" in philosophy” [8]. Such ideological dominance deprived Ukrainian scholars of relevant language and concepts for articulation and interpretation of their own national and cultural experience, particularly that which would differ from the Soviet narrative. Besides, the lack of stable connections with Western countries before the dissolution of the USSR further isolated Ukrainian philosophers, exacerbating the hermeneutical gap. Anatoly Loy recalls that, other than researchers based in Moscow, no one in the USSR had the opportunity to communicate with colleagues outside the socialist block [9]. Owing to the efforts of the experts in decolonial studies, more and more facts resurface, convincing that the articulation of one's experience was impossible up to the end of the USSR, considering that the scholars who dared to reveal their experience, were risking imprisonment. (The fate of Vasily Lisovyi, sentenced to seven years in prison camps for supporting the Sixtiers [Shistdesiatnyky] movement in the 1960s, is indicative in this regard).
Epistemic injustice, as can be seen from the above-mentioned examples, is not always obvious. Therefore, its harmful nature shows in the fact that oppressive practices can persist by inertia for a long time, even after the formal equality is granted, due to the impossibility of articulating such oppression (hermeneutical injustice) and the mistrust of the evidence of the representatives of the marginalised group as compared to the dominant one (testimonial injustice). Therefore, identifying the lived experience of Ukrainians within the USSR as colonial should be qualified as an act of decolonisation and a way forward to epistemic justice.
Endnotes
02. у контексті цієї статті совєцька ідентичність дорівнює російській, адже ідеологія, що панувала у СРСР врешті привела до зросійщення та пригнічення числений унікальних національних ідентичностей у межах СРСР
03. філософ, доктор філософських наук, професор. Працював у в Інституті філософії Академії наук УРСР з 1971 року
04. Loy, Anatoly, Illia Davidenko, Kseniia Myroshnyk, and Daria Popil. “The Mind behind the Iron Curtain: Ukrainian Philosophy of the Late USSR and World Science.” Sententiae 40, no. 2 (August 15, 2021): 161–83. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent40.02.161.
05. кандидатка філософських наук, старша наукова співробітниця відділу логіки і методології науки Інституту філософії ім. Г.С. Сковороди НАН України
06. Viatkina, Natalia, Amina Kkhelufi, Kseniia Myroshnyk, and Nataliia Reva. “‘The Saved and the Lost.’ Attempt to Recall on-Line. Part II.” Sententiae 40, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 160–74. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent40.01.160.
07. відповідальна редакторка журналу “Філософська думка” Інституту філософії ім. Г.С. Сковороди НАН України
08. Ivashchenko, Svitlana, Illia Davidenko, Vlada Anuchina, and Daria Popil. “The Thing: Why I’m an Editor. Part II.” Sententiae 42, no. 1 (April 30, 2023): 171–85. https://doi.org/10.31649/sent42.01.171.
09. Ibid, Loy, Davidenko, Myroshnyk, and Popil, 2021
Authors
Daria Popil
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